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Life Insurer Risk-Based Capital: An Option Pricing 
Approach 
Samuel H. Cox* and Arthur M.B. Hogan t 
Abstract 
This paper uses an option pricing framework to estimate life insurer risk-
based capital. Stock market data and statutory asset and liability data are 
used to calculate the implied level of statutory risk-based capital for each of 18 
insurers. We calculate the level of risk-based capital required to avoid subsidy 
from the guaranty fund. Our results suggest that less capital is required than 
that required under the New York actuarial risk-based capital formula. Firm 
rankings, however, are similar under both methods, although the methods are 
not directly comparable. We also determine the level of capital required if the 
subsidy provided to the sample of insurers by a guaranty fund is the same 
as that provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to U.S. 
banks. This level of capital is chosen because of the dominance of investment 
products for life insurers. When the results are compared with those found 
from a similar study of U.S. banks, it appears that the sample life insurers hold 
relatively greater capital than do the sample banks. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In return for receiving policyholders' premiums, insurers promise 
to pay claims, contingent upon the occurrence of specific events dur-
ing the insurance contract period. As these premiums are invested, 
policyholders provide the insurer with financing that is similar to a 
bank deposit (Quirin and Waters, 1975). Thus, both banks and insur-
ance companies assume liabilities, thereby creating pools of assets that 
they invest. Banks and life insurers are competitors. l Both make their 
money by investing the funds they generate at rates higher than their 
costs. As a result, the principal risk faced by banks and life insurers 
stems from their ability to maintain investment spreads and not suffer 
disintermediation2 in times of changing interest rates. This similarity 
is reflected in their financial structure. Both have similar capital/asset 
ratios: 6.2 percent for commercial banks and 6.6 percent for life insur-
ers as of December 31, 1989, and both have liabilities that are interest 
sensitive.3 
It is current public policy to protect the liability claims on both 
banks and insurance companies. The U.S. federal government provides 
bank deposit insurance, while states have established guaranty funds 
for policyholders. Risk-based capital and/or guarantee fund assess-
ments that reflect the insurer's risk of insolvency limit the incentive 
that stockholders have to increasing asset risk following the issuance 
of liabilities. An incentive for firms to increase risk arises because the 
guaranty funds alleviate policyholders' concern about firm risk (Babbel 
and Hogan, 1992).4 Cummins (1988) derive a method of determining 
risk-based assessment for guaranty funds that models guaranty fund 
1 For 1989 the American Council of Life Insurers reported in the Life Insurance Hand-
book that 70 percent of life insurer premiums were for annuities and investment prod-
ucts, which compete with bank certificates of deposit. 
2 Disintermediation refers to the movement of funds from low yielding accounts from 
traditional banking or insurance institutions to higher yielding investments in the gen-
eral market. 
3This excludes the Mandatory Securities Valuation Reserve (MSVR) held by life in-
surers. The MSVR is a reserve held against fluctuation in the insurer's asset portfolio. 
It is required by state regulations. 
4In a competitive market with perfect information and no regulation, the cost of an 
insurer's debt capital (underwriting) would vary directly with the risk of the insurer. 
All other things being equal, customers only would be attracted by riskier insurers' 
products if the premiums were lower. Guaranty funds have weakened this market 
discipline. The guaranty funds reimburse policyholders and third party claimants of 
insolvent insurers. This reduces policyholder concerns about insurer risk. 
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assessments as put options. In this paper we show that by modeling 
the value of the guaranty fund to an insurer as a put option, there is 
an equivalence between the risk-based guaranty fund assessments and 
risk-based capital. 5 
1.2 Risk-Based Capital 
Risk-based capital is the theoretical amount of capital needed to ab-
sorb the risks of operating a business having financial obligations to 
customers. A higher risk business requires more capital than does one 
of lower risk. Specifically, risk-based capital is the amount of capital 
necessary to insure that the business has an acceptably low expecta-
tion of becoming insolvent. Failure to recognize the consistency of risk 
measurement may produce unintended market displacements, such as 
reduced product availability. Because the measure of solvency risk can 
be described as the expected value of policyholder deficit before guar-
anty fund recoupment, this measure is equivalent to using the proba-
bility of insolvency impairment, provided the probability distribution 
remains the same. 
U.S. regulators of the banking and thrift industries recently have be-
gun phasing in a risk-based capital measure as one component of a new 
set of supervisory ratios that will be used to assess capital adequacy. 
The new standards are based on a framework, referred to by some as 
the Basle Accord,6 developed by an international group of bank regu-
lators. Similarly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) has developed risk-based capital standards for insurers'? Under 
the NAIC Risk-Based Capital Model Act, there are four levels of statu-
tory surplus (the difference between statutory assets and liabilities) that 
trigger required actions by management and regulators. These surplus 
level triggers are based on threshold risk-based capital multiples under 
which successively more severe regulatory activity is indicated. The 
thresholds of the risk-based capital multiple are as follows: 
1. Company action level event threshold is 100 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A company action level event re-
5 An insurer's expected cost to the guarantee fund varies with its risk. If there is a 
fixed risk-based capital level that is the same across all firm, this cost can be priced 
using risk-based assessments. If there are fixed assessments, the risk of different firms 
can be made equivalent by requiring different levels of risk-based capital. 
6The Basle Accord is an agreement by the G-? countries and the European Union 
which implements risk-based capital standards for banks. 
7Some European countries have had risk-based capital requirements for their do-
mestic insurers for more than 20 years. 
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quires a company to submit a business plan to the state, to show 
how the risk-based capital value will be improved; 
2. Regulatory action level event threshold is 75 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A regulatory action level event 
could, in addition to the requirements under item 1, trigger a state 
investigation or examination; 
3. Authorized control level event threshold is 50 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. An authorized control level event 
enables a state to take the company under supervision, although 
it is not required to do so. 
4. Mandatory control level event threshold is 35 percent of the for-
mula risk-based capital value. A mandatory control level event 
requires the regulator in the state to take the company under su-
pervision. 
If the surplus falls below 20 percent of the calculated risk-based capital, 
then the insurance commissioner must move to place the company in 
conserva tion. 
The advantage of using risk-based capital over risk-based guaranty 
fund assessment is that it is compatible with current guaranty funds. 
With the exception of New York, insurance guarantee funds are based 
on post assessments. The assessment to cover a failed insurer is pro-
rated by line of business across the remaining insurers in the state. 
There is an annual cap on assessments to each insurer, but required 
funds in excess of the cap can be rolled over to the following years. 
New York, on the other hand, charges each insurer a premium each 
year for coverage against their failure. Thus, insurance guaranty funds, 
except in New York, operate on a post-assessment basis, i.e., the sol-
vent companies are assessed an amount equal to the shortfall in assets 
of the insolvent firm. The assessment for a solvent company is a flat 
percentage of premium volume. The guaranty funds, like bank deposit 
insurance, have the industry as the primary obligator. The guaranty 
funds differ from bank deposit insurance, however, in that there is no 
contingent obligator and bank deposit insurance requires prior assess-
ment premiums. 
In many states the assessment that a solvent company pays to the 
guaranty fund is credited against its state premium tax. The effect is to 
pass the cost of insolvencies to the taxpayers because the premium tax 
revenue is reduced by the cost of the insolvency. In other states policy-
holders bear the cost through increased premiums charged by solvent 
companies. Thus, the losses arising from insurance insolvencies pass 
Cox and Hogan: Risk-Based Capital 9 
through the insurance system either to the taxing authority by reduced 
insurance company taxes or to the policyholders by higher insurance 
premiums (Barese and Nelson, 1991). 
If it is not politically feasible to create a prior assessment system for 
insurance, then there are only two means of reducing costs of the incen-
tives for risky strategies: (i) rigid control of the asset and liability risks 
of insurers; or (ii) adjustment of the leverage through the application 
of risk-based capital adequacy standards. 
1.3 Objectives 
Merton (1977) pioneered the application of option pricing to deposit 
insurance. Ronn and Verma (1986) use Merton's approach to study 
risk-adjusted premiums for deposit insurance for U.S. banks. Cummins 
(1988) extends the option pricing approach to the calculation of risk-
based premiums for insurance guaranty funds for U.S. property-liability 
insurers. The model used in this paper also is based on option valuation 
principles. Although our aim is to establish risk-based capital levels 
rather than guaranty fund premiums, we show that there is an inverse 
relationship between capital levels and guaranty fund premiums: the 
higher the level of capital per unit of claim an insurer has, other things 
being equal, the lower the likelihood of default and, hence, the lower 
the risk-based guaranty fund premium. 
The objectives of this paper are as follows: (i) to develop a model 
based on option valuation principles; (ii) to illustrate an equivalence 
between risk-based capital and risk-based guaranty fund assessment 
using an option-based model; (iii) to determine capital adequacy stan-
dards for a sample of 18 publicly traded insurers using the model; (iv) to 
compare the risk-based capital calculated from the option model with 
statutory value capital standards; and (v) to compare the level of risk-
based capital held by life insurers with the level calculated by Ronn and 
Verma (1988) for banks. 
2 The Option Pricing Model 
The liabilities of life insurers are composed of term life and invest-
ment products. 8 If a firm underwrites a suffiCient number of term life 
policies the value of the liability is essentially fixed. Insurer investment 
8Whole life, universal life, and variable life are contracts composed of term life in-
surance and investment products that can be used to pay premiums. 
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offerings such as annuities are driven by the same market forces that 
affect the insurer's assets. Thus, we assume that only one stochastic 
process drives the change in the life insurer's financial position. This 
is unlike Cummins' model for property/casualty insurers that has sep-
arate processes for both assets and liabilities. The advantage of using 
the one stochastic process approach is that all of the variables in our 
model are observable. In Cummins' model there are no dividends paid 
to stockholders, so we have used the method of Roll (1977) to adjust for 
dividends. Cummins' notation is used to the extent possible to allow 
the reader to compare the models. 
Let us assume that an insurer's asset/liability ratio follows a diffu-
sion process: 
dx = (r - 8)xdt + (J'xdz(t) for 0::; t::; T (1) 
where 
A The value of the insurer's assets; 
L The value of the insurer's liabilities; 
x Insurer's asset/liability ratio, i.e., x = AIL; 
z(t) A standard Brownian motion process for x; 
8 Dividend payout rate per dollar of assets; 
r Rate of change in capital structure for this company; and 
T Time until expiration of option, i.e., time until 
the company's next examination. 
The change in the asset/liability ratio, dx, is a function of the return 
on the insurer's equity less any dividend payments, (r - 8)xdt, with 
the addition of a white noise error term, (J'xdz(t). The term 8x repre-
sents a decrease in assets as dividends are paid. Dividend payout rates 
normally are given as a percentage of equity. If f3 is the dividend rate in 
terms of equity E, then the initial annual rate of dividend payment can 
be calculated in two ways, giving the same result: f3E = 8A. Thus, f3 
or 8 can be calculated from the other given initial values of assets and 
equity. 
Each year the state insurance regulators ascertain the values of eq-
uity. If the equity of the company falls below the required capital, the 
company is placed into conservatorship by the regulator. If the com-
pany cannot be rehabilitated, the assets will be used to pay obligations 
to policyholders. 
Policyholders are protected by a promise from the guaranty fund to 
pay the excess, if any, of the liability value L over the asset value A. 
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This is similar to a financial put option written on x with striking price 
of one. The guaranty fund payment is 
max(O,L - A) = Lmax(O, 1 - x), 
which is the same as the put option payment. 
3 The Pricing Formula 
3.1 Assumptions 
The single premium for coverage until the next audit9 at time T, 
given current levels of assets A and liabilities L can be derived in the 
same way Black and Scholes derived the formula for the price of a Eu-
ropean option on a stock. For a derivation of the formula in its original 
setting, see Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), or Merton (1990). 
The Society of Actuaries monograph by Boyle (1992) includes a good 
discussion of the economic content of the assumptions underlying the 
Black Scholes model. 
There are six major assumptions underlying the Black and Scholes 
(1973) formula. Boyle (1992) discusses all of these, although he ex-
plicitly lists only the first five assumptions. Hull (1993) gives a simi-
lar discussion. IO These authors also give the arguments leading to the 
Black and Scholes formula. For a precise mathematical treatment of the 
implications of these assumptions, see Duffie (1992). The assumptions 
are: 
1. The asset liability ratio x on which the option is written follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, as described in the previous section. 
The volatility parameter is denoted by 0'. 
2. The security pays dividends at a constant known rate 8. 
3. There is a constant, default free rate of interest r. 
4. There are no taxes or transactions costs. All traders can borrow 
and lend cash at same rate r. Securities are infinitely divisible. 
The ratio and the option written on it can be bought and sold 
short by all traders. 
9 All insurers annually file audited statutory statements with state regulators. Stock 
insurers file annuallO(k) statements with the Securities Exchange Commission. Regu-
lators examine insurers every three to five years depending upon the state of domicile. 
All audits and examinations are paid by the firm. 
IOThis textbook appears on the Society of Actuaries education syllabus. 
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5. The ratio and the option on it can be trade continuously. 
6. There are no arbitrage opportunities. This implies that two Euro-
pean style securities (or combinations of securities into portfolios) 
that have the same payoff at time T must have the same market 
value at time t < T. 
The option in our model satisfies these assumptions (or fails to satisfy 
them) to the same degree as options on stocks, with one notable ex-
ception: our option is not traded. The option pricing formula gives a 
market value which traders would agree on, if it were traded. The op-
tion formula for stocks works well and is widely used, which suggests 
its use in this model. 
3.2 The Formula 
The Blackand Scholes (1973) formula is adapted to our situation as 
follows: let p(x, t) denote the premium at time t, given x = AIL. At the 
time T of expiration, p(x, T) = max(O, I-x). The boundary conditions 
are 
p(O, t) = eY(T-tl and p(x, T) = max(O, 1 - x). 
The Black and Scholes (1973) formula for the price p of a European put 
option on a security with market value x and with striking price equal 
to one is 
where 
d 
_ In(x) + (r - O)T 0--jT 
- 0--jT + 2 . 
Here N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, i.e., 
and T = T - t. 
fy e-s2/2 N(y) = --ds -00 J2ii 
(2) 
The price of the guaranty in terms of the original variables is found 
by multiplying by L: 
P(A, L, T) = Le-rT N (-d + o-JT) - Ae-oT N (-d) (3) 
where 
d 
_ In(A/L) + (r - O)T 0--jT 
- 0--jT + 2 . (4) 
Equation (3) relates the price P of guaranty fund insurance to the vari-
ables A, L, r, 0, and T, which are known at the beginning of the insur-
ance period, and to 0-, which is the unknown volatility parameter. 
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4 Estimation of Volatility Parameter (J" 
Because the guaranty is invoked when the insurer falls below the re-
quired level of capital, the variability of all liabilities, not just the guar-
anteed liabilities, will affect regulatory action. To estimate the volatility, 
we consider the position of the stockholders. The value of their rights 
to the company amounts to an American call option on the assets with 
exercise price equal to the liabilities expiring at time T. The notion that 
equity of a levered firm (Le., a firm financed in part by issuing bonds) 
can be thought of as a call option appears in most introductory cor-
porate finance textbooks; see Brigham and Gapinski (1991, p. 700), for 
example. Equity-financed life insurance companies typically do not is-
sue bonds, but borrow instead from their customers. The life insurer's 
liabilities consist of obligations to pay benefits, in effect repaying its 
debt to policyholders. 
If the assets AT at time T are worth more than the liabilities LT, 
then the shareholders have a net value of AT - LT > O. If the assets 
are less, AT < LT, then the shareholders can abandon the firm, leaving 
it to the policyholders (lenders), and have no further obligation. Thus, 
the shareholders' value at time T is max(AT - LT, 0), the payoff of a 
European call option. As it usually is not optimal to exercise a call early 
(see Hull, 1993, p. 235), we assume that the option will not be exer-
cised early. In this case, the American call can be priced as if it were 
a European call. The value of the call option C at time t depends on 
A = At, L = Lt , and T = T - t. The Black and Scholes formula for the 
call option is derived in the same way as the put option formula for 
P(A,L, T), which we discussed in Section 3. The boundary conditions 
are C(A, L, 0) = max(A - L, 0) and C(O, L, T) = O. The firm pays divi-
dends continuously at a rate of 6; it has volatility 0- 2; and the valuation 
interest rate is r. By multiplying through by L, the Black and Scholes 
call option formula gives the market value of the insurer's equity E, 
which is equal to C (A, L, T) in the option notation: 
E = C(A,L, T) = Le-<hN(d) - Ae-YTN(d - o-JT) (5) 
where 
d 
_ In(A/L) + (r - 6)T °o-ft 
- o-ft + 2 . (6) 
The call option's value is equal to the firm's equity before the intro-
duction of the guaranty fund. As insurer guaranty fund assessments 
are ex post, the introduction of the guaranty funds does not, in anr: of 
itself, change the variance of the portfolio. The value of the insurer's 
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equity E is known at the beginning of the insurance period, as are all 
of the other variables in the call formula except cr. Hence, this deter-
mines cr implicitly (Latane and Rendleman, 1976). Given the values of 
E, A, L, D, r, and T, the implied asset liability ratio volatility cr 2 can be 
calculated by simultaneously solving equations (5) and (6). In this way 
we solve using the Newton-Raphson methodll for the value of cr for 
which the calculated price equals the observed stock market price.l 2 
We then use the implied value of cr to find the level of capital A by 
solving equations (3) and (4.) This determines the desired level A using 
the statutory accounting value of the assets and liabilities. The solution 
again is found by using the Newton-Raphson method. 
We examine the case where the guaranty fund provides no subsidy 
to insurers. Because most life insurer premiums now are derived from 
investment grade products, we have set the guaranty subsidy equal to 
that used by Ronn and Verma (1988) in their study of banks. They use 
a guaranty fund premium of 1/1200 of assets to find the implicit level 
of required capital. In this model we use the stock price the day after 
the deadline for filing statutory statements in 1990 and use an option 
life of one year, which is the next time that statutory statements will be 
filed and the next time that regulatory monitoring may be performed. 
5 Estimates of Capital Adequacy Standards 
The method described in Section 3 is applied to a sample of 18 stock 
life insurers for which data are available. The characteristics of the 
sample firms are shown in Table 1. The firm selection criteria are that 
there are no material operations in the holding company's operations 
other than life insurance, that the statement blanks can be obtained by 
the authors, and that the firm is not a First Executive company (because 
they were placed in conservation by regulators in the following year). 
llThe Newton-Raphson method is used to determine the roots of an equation; see, 
for example, Burden and Faires (1985). 
12 An added benefit is that the technique avoids the problem of non stationarity of the 
variance. 
n 
0 
x 
Table 1 llJ 
Sample Firm Characteristics ::J c.. 
Statutory I 0 
Price Number Dividends per Statutory Statutory Guaranteed 10 llJ 
Name l2er Share of Shares Share Assets Liabilities Liabilities 
::J 
Acceleration Life 7.50 4,946,934 0.28 104,737 84,073 30,602 
;;JJ 
VI 
American Heritage Life 27.38 5,948,862 0.90 770,915 697,148 612,095 ;:;' OJ 
American National 36.25 27,476,757 1.89 4,079,900 3,083,802 2,534,885 llJ VI 
Chesapeake Life 12.00 963,764 1.00 43,953 40,910 37,187 It> c.. 
Durham Life 31.00 8,457,900 0.92 732,195 632,483 521,798 n llJ 
Equitable Life of Iowa 52.75 7,087,440 1.27 1,842,833 1,609,512 1,311,888 "0 ,... 
Financial Benefit Life 16.25 5,061,833 690,079 666,169 548 ~ 
Independent Life & Accident 21.25 6,658 0.87 1,080,502 977,675 882,934 
Integrated Resources Life 12.50 1,853 77,874 58,383 79,036 
Jefferson Pilot Life 55.25 35,757,482 1.36 4,284,743 3,424,165 2,729,960 
Kansas City Life 36.00 7,143,056 1.28 1,694,614 1,557,459 1,099,084 
Kentucky Central Life 8.75 13,439,765 0.40 1,303,927 1,218,565 1,197,728 
Lincoln National Life 56.13 43,042,771 2.92 23,530,710 22,475,823 16,764,837 
Manhattan Life 5.75 6,584,069 471,793 434,454 425,148 
National Western Life 36.75 6,955,724 2,100,663 2,017,469 1,779,068 
Presidential Life 8.88 28,612,869 0.20 2,069,631 1,931,711 2,202,648 
Protective Life 25.88 13,611,646 0.83 2,495,755 2,318,470 1,596,399 
Washington National Insurance 24.88 20,292,856 1.08 1,577,842 1,387,665 
f-' 
U1 
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Table 2 presents the results of the option model calculation for each 
firm when there is a guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks. 
A detailed example of the calculations for the first firm is shown in 
the appendix. The results are shown for two different types of guaran-
tees: the column entitled guaranteed risk-based capital assumes that 
the guaranty funds only will cover policyholder liabilities; the other as-
sumes that all liabilities are covered. We examine the level of risk-based 
capital for covering all liabilities because the nonguaranteed liabilities 
may be held by sophisticated investors who may cashout their claims 
before regulators are able to act. The sample firms carry from 22 per-
cent to 61 percent more capital than required. Ronn and Verma (1988), 
in their study of 43 banks, find that capital infusions of 5 percent to 
43 percent are required to meet this implicit cost of deposit insurance. 
This indicates that the subsidy received by the sample banks from de-
posit guarantees is greater than that received by the sample of insurers 
from policyholder guarantees. On the other hand, Table 3 presents the 
results of the option model calculation for each firm when there is no 
guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks. 
Table 4 shows the results of the calculation of the required risk-
based capital using the actuarial formula implemented in New York. 
We examine the New York model because it is used as the basis for the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model, and 
unlike the NAIC formula, it can be calculated using publicly disclosed 
information. 13 
In the formula-based models, the amount of risk-based capital for 
each source of risk (e.g., underwriting, investment, or credit) must be 
such that the risk of insolvency (or other applicable impairment) is di-
rectly proportional to the amount of risk-based capital for each source 
of risk. The formula has multipliers for the accounts (sources of risk) 
that appear on the statutory statement. The amount of risk-based cap-
ital is the sum of the products of the multiplier and the item amounts. 
The actuarial risk-based capital formula considers each account as a 
separate risk that can be evaluated separately and that total risk is the 
sum of the standard errors.14 
13The NAIC is concerned that the insurers would use the ratio of their capital to re-
quired risk-based capital in marketing promotions. They feel that this could mislead 
consumers into thinking that there are material differences between firms for which 
none exist. Therefore, the NAIC has decided that risk-based capital results for individ-
ual companies should not be public. 
14For this type of additivity to hold, pairs of risks X, Y must have correlation coeffi-
cient equal to one, i.e., PX.Y = 1. In other words, provided the second moments exist, 
the standard deviation of X + Y is equal to the sum of the standard deviation of X and 
the standard deviation of Y if and only if P x, y = 1. 
Table 2 
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital Assuming Guaranty Fund 
Guaranteed Guaranteed % Capital 
Implied Capital Excess Excess Excess 
Name Variance {Deficiency) {Deficiency) (Deficiency} 
Acceleration Life 0.26 53,084,261 47% 53,006,216 
American Heritage Life 0.12 253,480,724 38% 253,007,045 
American National 0.17 2,018,834,565 52% 2,016,068,098 
Chesapeake Life 0.21 18,036,117 41% 18,004,768 
Durham Life 0.02 251,012,643 34% 250,469,370 
Equitable Life of Iowa 4.70 559,086,609 33% 557,752,727 
Financial Benefit Life 0.16 142,267,125 25% 141,849,889 
Independent Life & Accident 0.21 430,826,041 42% 430,101,247 
Integrated Resources Life 0.17 45,042,047 40% 44,955,558 
Jefferson Pilot Life 0.31 2,161,564,584 55% 2,158,874,522 
Kansas City Life 0.00 963,463,689 52% 962,091,518 
Kentucky Central Life 0.03 380,373,973 29% 379,395,984 
Lincoln National Life 0.01 5,211,303,291 28% 5,197,229,745 
Manhattan Life 0.00 119,725,355 25% 119,354,135 
National Western Life 0.00 1,154,902,839 61% 1,153,738,870 
Presidential Life 0.00 518,036,998 22% 516,279,542 
Protective Life 0.00 527,312,539 28% 525,869,501 
Reliable Life 1.19 219,063,236 57% 218,818,457 
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Table 3 
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital 
Assuming No Guaranty Fund 
Guaranteed Guaranteed % Capital 
Capital Excess % Excess Capital Excess Excess 
Name (Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency) 
Acceleration Life 51,604,853 46% 51,526,807 46% 
American Heritage 220,258,828 33% 219,785,112 33% 
Life 
American National 1,307,755,545 34% 1,304,988,248 33% 
Chesapeake Life 16,016,556 36% 15,985,206 36% 
Durham Life 167,229,558 23% 166,686,160 23% 
Equitable Life of 312,095,070 18% 310,760,531 18% 
Iowa 
Financial Benefit 140,680,341 25% 140,263,103 25% 
Life 
Independent Life & 397,514,797 39% 396,789,972 38% 
Accident 
Integrated Resources 31,568,690 28% 31,482,146 28% 
Life 
Jefferson Pilot Life 1,947,590,616 50% 1,944,900,292 50% 
Kansas City Life 467,200,586 25% 465,827,244 25% 
Kentucky Central 331,336,111 25% 330,358,058 25% 
Life 
Lincoln National 4,289,858,928 23% 4,275,783,945 23% 
Life 
Manhattan Life 90,218,902 19% 89,847,599 19% 
National Western 1,123,218,068 59% 1,122,054,076 59% 
Life 
Presidential Life 470,986,004 20% 469,228,467 20% 
Protective Life 384,294,881 20% 382,851,483 20% 
Reliable Life 212,789,180 56% 212,544,396 56% 
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Table 4 
New York Formula Calculated Risk-Based Capital 
Formula Capital Excess % Formula Capital 
Name (Deficiency) Excess (Deficiency) 
Acceleration Life 15,394,363 14% 
American Heritage Life 88,567,275 13% 
American National 628,316,718 16% 
Chesapeake Life 7,510,633 17% 
Durham Life 65,102,344 9% 
Equitable Life of Iowa 226,956,248 13% 
Financial Benefit Life 10,624,307 2% 
Independent Life & Accident 191,536,623 19% 
Integrated Resources Life 3,448,566 3% 
Jefferson Pilot Life 465,811,716 12% 
Kansas City Life 210,042,906 11% 
Kentucky Central Life 210,623,736 16% 
Lincoln National Life 1,455,672,163 8% 
Manhattan Life 24,318,229 5% 
National Western Life 106,808,768 6% 
Presidential Life 134,899,050 6% 
Protective Life 187,268,805 10% 
Reliable Life 36,846,203 10% 
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In contrast, the option-based model, which examines the risks as a 
portfolio, makes no assumption about the correlation of the risks. The 
excess or deficiency of capital as a fraction of the book value of the 
firm's assists is reported. 
The New York formula requires more capital than that imposed by 
the option-based model. All other things equal, the lower level of capi-
tal required by the New York formula would provide a relatively greater 
subsidy. There is a difference, however, in the regulatory actions as-
sumed in developing the models. The option model assumes that the 
regulator liquidates the insurer when there is insufficient capital. On 
the other hand, the New York actuarial model provides for several lev-
els of regulatory response that culminates in placing the insurer under 
supervision when the insurer has less than 20 percent of its required 
risk-based capital. 
The New York formula requires an average of 37 percent more cap-
ital from the sample firms. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
between the option and actuarial risk-based capital calculations is 0.21. 
The difference between the New York formula and the option model 
does not appear to be affected by firm size, because the correlation 
of the difference of firm rankings by the two models with firm size is 
0.01. This is probably due to the dominance of investment products (li-
abilities), which are correlated with the assets because of their shared 
market risk. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper develops a risk-based capital calculation model for insur-
ers, as ongoing concerns, by equating the cost of one year guarantees. 
The model assumes that the asset to liability ratio can be described by 
diffusion processes and that the guaranty fund will pay its obligations. 
The differences in the calculated levels of capital by the actuarial-based 
models, such as those used by the states of Minnesota and New York, 
and the option-based models appear to arise from the difference in reg-
ulatory action assumed by the models when a firm has a capital short-
fall. The divergence in firm rank between the two risk-based capital 
models does not appear to arise from differences in measuring portfo-
lio risk. 
An additional application of our option model is to provide a means 
of assessing the relative levels of required capital across financial inter-
mediaries. The model provides guidance to regulators in determining 
levels of capital and/or premiums to guaranty funds to create a level 
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playing field across financial intermediaries. Thus, disintermediation 
between financial institutions and the waste from economic friction as-
sociated with transaction costs of disintermediation could be avoided. 
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Appendix 
Using Acceleration Life as the example provides 
E $37,102,005; 
A $112,572,000; 
L $91,233,000; and 
d O. 
Substituting into equations (5) and (6) yields an equation for the volatil-
ity parameter (T: 
37,102,005 = 112,572, OOON(d) - 91,233, OOOOe-O.OB N(d - (T) 
where 
d = In(A/89, OO~ 000) + 0.08 + ~. 
Using the Newton-Raphson method to find the implied variance yields 
(T2 =- 0.26. Solving for the required level of risk-based capital by sub-
stituting into equations (3) and (4), setting the exercise price equal to 
the guaranteed liability value of $89,022,000, and setting the expected 
cost to the guaranty fund to be 1/1200 of the firm's assets gives 
98,310 = 89,022, OOOe-O.OB N( -d - -J(i) - AN( -d) 
where 
d _ In(A/89, 002, 000) + 0.08 ')0.26 
- ')0.26 + 2 
Using the Newton-Raphson method to solve for the required level of 
capital A yields A = $59,487,739. 

